- CVE-2026-48618: tls: IDNA-normalize the peer hostname before splitting it into DNS labels in checkServerIdentity(), so the verifier splits the same labels the resolver does and a Unicode dot separator (U+3002/U+FF0E/U+FF61) can no longer defeat the wildcard-depth rule (backport of nodejs/node@2197a471 plus the mandatory IPv6 IP-SAN follow-up @1d87a240) - CVE-2026-48928: tls: add the 'i' flag to the RegExp built by Server.prototype.addContext(), so SNI context matching is case-insensitive as RFC 6066 Section 3 requires and an uppercased SNI hostname can no longer fall back to the default context, bypassing per-tenant mTLS client-CA policy (backport of nodejs/node@39d1d096) - CVE-2026-48934: tls: bind a reusable client session to the host it was authenticated for, so a session obtained from one host can no longer be replayed against another to skip checkServerIdentity() on resumption (backport of nodejs/node@fd890ba0) - CVE-2026-58040: https: bind identity checks to session reuse -- the incomplete-fix follow-up to CVE-2026-48934, which left the https.Agent layer untouched, so getName() did not key on checkServerIdentity, sessions were cached purely on options._agentKey and there was no keepSocketAlive override. A request with a custom per-request checkServerIdentity is now excluded from socket reuse and from the TLS session cache, so a connection authenticated under one callback cannot be resumed under another, where the identity check is skipped (backport of nodejs/node@51123159, the v22.x release-line commit shipped in v22.23.2; the upstream establishTunnel() hunk is dropped because 14.21.3 has no proxy-tunnel support in lib/https.js)